19 April 1962

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Analysis Branch, DD/CR

FROM : Chief, Publications Staff, ORR

SUBJECT : Release of CIA/RR GM 62-4, Air Access to Berlin, SECRET, to Foreign Governments

25X1C

1. It is requested that the attached copies of subject report be forwarded as follows:

350-351
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[redacted]

2. All ORR responsibilities as defined in the DDI memorandum of 13 August 1952, "Procedures for Dissemination of Finished Intelligence to Foreign Governments," as applicable to this report, have been fulfilled.

[redacted] 25X1A

Attachments

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GEOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

CIA/RR GM 62-4
April 1962

AIR ACCESS TO BERLIN

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS

SECRET

AIR ACCESS TO BERLIN

The location of Berlin 110 miles east of the Federal Republic of Germany results in a problem of Western access having two facets: first, exposure of US, UK, and French communication lines to Communist interference; second, need for maintaining the free movement of German citizens and civilian goods between the Federal Republic of Germany and West Berlin and within Greater Berlin. Since 13 August 1961, movement within Greater Berlin has been effectively curtailed. The air corridors are the last remaining traffic arteries between West Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany over which both civil and military traffic can move without being subjected to either Soviet or East German controls.

Historical Basis for Access to West Berlin

The position of the Western Powers in Berlin, which derives from the unconditional surrender of Germany at the end of World War II, was recognized in a 1944 agreement of the European Advisory Commission, in which the USSR as well as the Western Powers participated.** In the immediate postwar years the Allied Control Council concluded a number of quadripartite agreements governing Allied access to Berlin. On 30 March 1948, however, the Soviet authorities initiated the series of restrictions on passenger and freight movement to and from Berlin, which ultimately culminated in the Berlin Blockade of 1948-49. The blockade lasted for almost 11 months. After it ended, however, the general Western rights of access were reconfirmed by the USSR in the New York and Paris Agreements of May and June 1949, respectively. In September 1955 the USSR signed a "Treaty on Relations" with East Germany in which it recognized the "sovereignty" of the regime, but in a subsequent exchange of letters between the foreign ministers the Soviets "temporarily" reserved for themselves control of the traffic of the Western garrisons between West Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany. There has been no subsequent formal documentation; but, as late as 19 March 1959, Khrushchev admitted that the Allies "have lawful rights for their stay in Berlin."

Surface Access in Relation to Air Access

The amount of freight moving to and from West Berlin by air under normal circumstances is only a minor portion of total traffic. Passenger traffic by air, however, has played an important role, especially for refugees, who comprised 14.4 percent of the total in 1960 and 13.3 percent in 1961. Although the stream of refugees has dropped off to a mere trickle, the outlet is important for the morale of the West Berliners, especially for those whose personal safety demands that they not be subjected to either Soviet or East German document controls.

The dependence of West Berlin on surface contact with the Federal Republic is strikingly reflected by statistics on highway traffic along routes connecting the two (see table). The average number of vehicles that passed through the Babelsberg

* This report had been prepared in response to a request of the Berlin Task Force.
** Berlin was occupied in accordance with the London Protocol of 12 September 1944 concerning the Zones of Occupation in Germany and the Administration of Greater Berlin and with the London Agreement of 14 November 1944 concerning the control machinery in Germany, and the city was placed under the administration of the inter-Allied Komandatura. The Komandatura was directly and exclusively subordinate to the Allied Control Council set up for the whole of Germany.

Civil Traffic to West Berlin

	Freight			
	1961		1960	
Incoming	Metric Tons	Percent of Total	Metric Tons	Percent of Total
Highway	2,861,467	35.9	2,913,200	35.7
Rail	2,309,316	29.0	2,249,344	27.6
Water	2,787,321	35.0	2,985,098	36.6
Air	6,775	0.1	5,359	0.1
Total	7,964,879	100.0	8,153,001	100.0
Outgoing				
Highway	1,175,941	62.2	1,059,839	61.6
Rail	273,801	14.5	240,847	14.0
Water	430,017	22.8	410,876	23.9
Air	9,953	0.5	8,471	0.5
Total	1,889,712	100.0	1,720,033	100.0

	Passenger Traffic			
	1961		1960	
Incoming	No. of Vehicles	Passengers	No. of Vehicles	Passengers
Automobile	629,674	1,617,407	531,645	1,384,494
Buses	29,147	784,631	27,852	757,715
Cycles	12,155	19,002	12,982	20,824
Rail	N.A.	2,148,473 a/	N.A.	2,304,716 a/
Aircraft	19,948	722,849 b/	17,856	688,231 b/
Outgoing				
Automobile	641,193	1,672,622	522,883	1,390,438
Buses	29,185	804,859	28,056	770,095
Cycles	12,955	20,569	13,934	22,660
Rail	N.A.	2,009,168 a/	N.A.	2,220,761 a/
Aircraft	19,947	775,449 b/	17,815	722,007 b/

a. Figure includes all rail passengers crossing border of Federal Republic, exclusive Berlin statistics not available.
b. Excluding flyouts of refugees (115,599 in 1961; 121,778 in 1960).

checkpoint in each direction during a 24-hour period in 1960 was 1,444 cars, 507 trucks, 76 buses, and 37 motorcycles; the over-all average was 3 vehicles per minute. In 1961, daily car traffic increased to 1,741 and bus traffic to 80.

The US, UK, and French garrisons in West Berlin normally receive the bulk of their military supplies by surface transport, via one highway and one rail line that cross the border at Helmstedt and three air corridors, which connect Berlin with Hamburg, Hannover, and Frankfurt. Five authorized crossing points, including Helmstedt-Marienborn, were established to serve the far greater civilian needs in terms of freight and passenger service between West Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany.

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All civil rail freight between the Federal Republic and West Berlin is channeled through the Helmstedt-Marienborn crossing point and enters West Berlin via Griebnitzsee near Potsdam. This is the same line that is used for military traffic. A 1945 quadripartite agreement authorized the daily entry of 13 freight trains (including Allied military freight trains) with a maximum capacity of 800 tons each. Outbound freight trains, which average one per day, have not been limited by any agreement. Empty freight cars from West Berlin are routed back to the Federal Republic via Stendal and Oebisfelde-Vorsfelde.

Civil rail passenger traffic uses the following authorized crossing points: Buchen-Schwanheide, Vorsfelde-Oebisfelde, Helmstedt-Marienborn, Bebra-Wartha, Ludwigslust-Probstzella, Hof-Gutenforst, and Lübeck-Herrnburg. Trains using the last two do not go directly to Berlin, which makes a change of trains necessary.

Civil road traffic may utilize the Eisenach and Hof Autobahnen as well as the Helmstedt Autobahn used by the Occupation Powers. All three Autobahnen meet near Babelsberg, just outside Berlin. Two additional highway routes to West Berlin are available -- Highway 5 from Hamburg, which crosses the border near Boizenburg and enters West Berlin at Staaken, and a highway that enters East Germany north of Lübeck and leads via Schwerin and Ludwigslust, where it joins Highway 5, to West Berlin.

Two inland waterways, the Elbe River and the Mittelland Canal, connect the Federal Republic and East Germany. Both are linked to Greater Berlin by a system of canals.

Western military and official personnel travel on documents issued by their military commanders or by their ambassadors in Bonn. Western military freight traffic is not subject to inspection. All types of civil passenger and freight traffic along surface routes, however, are subject to customs and immigration control upon entry into East Germany.

Routes of Air Access

Immediately after World War II, Western access to Berlin was governed by an informal agreement under which Western pilots en route to Berlin were to follow the railroad or Autobahn from Helmstedt to Berlin. During the 1945 negotiations that led to the establishment of the air corridors, the United States proposed six corridors -- the present three plus others to Copenhagen, Warsaw, and Prague. The USSR refused to consider the last three, but on 30 November 1945 the Allied Control Council approved a paper that provided for the three air corridors now in effect. The north corridor is 135 nautical miles long, the central corridor is 123 nautical miles, and the south corridor is 226 nautical miles. The paper stipulated that flights through these corridors could proceed without notice and that responsibility for drawing up safety measures and flight rules for the corridors would rest with the Air Directorate of the Control Council. A final agreement was concluded early in 1946, and the Berlin Air Safety Center (BASC) was established in February 1946.

Rules governing corridor flights are available in the basic document, Flight Rules for Aircraft Flying in the Air Corridors of Germany and the Berlin Control Zone, dated 22 October 1946. Although the corridors are located and are specifically described as 20 statute miles wide, no maximum or minimum altitudes are given. A maximum altitude of 10,000 feet, however, is specified for the Berlin Control Zone, which is defined as the area within a radius of 20 statute miles (17.4 nautical miles) of the Allied Control Authority Building in Berlin. Because this building and Templehof do not have identical locations, the Berlin terminal area extends 15.2 nautical miles to the east, 15.3 nautical miles to the south, and 19 nautical miles to the north of Templehof Airfield. Many ground-based navi-

gational aids are available for use within the corridors, the Berlin area, and the associated terminal areas. Rules require that plans for corridor flights be filed with BASC and that aircraft desiring to cross a corridor must, whenever possible, call the appropriate communications station in advance to obtain clearance. Aircraft unable to receive such clearance must cross at a "magnetic heading" of 90 degrees to the corridor at a predesignated altitude. Since the Soviet planes could fly anywhere else in East Germany and since the USSR had participated in the drawing up of corridor-flight rules, the USSR in practice recognized that the corridors were established for Western use and Soviet flights were adjusted so as not to interfere with Western flights. Until February 1962 the corridors were used almost exclusively by Western air craft.

Use of the air corridors is restricted to commercial and military planes of the Occupation Powers and is subject to procedures and regulations agreed upon by the quadripartite BASC. The Western Powers license commercial air operations in the three air corridors. Western civil and US military flights to Templehof are controlled by the US Air Force; and flights terminating at Tegel Airfield are controlled by the French authorities. Tegel also functions as a secondary airfield for Templehof, and planes landing there do not require express authorization. Gatow Airfield is used almost exclusively for military flights and is controlled by the British.

In 1961, a total of 19,947 round-trip commercial flights were made to Berlin, or about 55 a day. The licensed commercial carriers are: PANAM, currently with 25 scheduled round trips daily using DC 6B's; BEA, with 10 round trips daily using turboprop Viscounts; and Air France, with 6 round trips daily, using Caravelles. Air France flights terminates at Tegel and the other carriers, at Templehof.

The number of military flights varies considerably, but US flights have probably averaged from 125 to 150 round trips per month. No estimates are available for UK and French military flights.

Western Airlift Problems and Capabilities

In response to the 1948-49 Soviet-imposed blockade of surface transport around West Berlin, the United States and the United Kingdom conducted an airlift involving 267,472 flights and 2,185,247 tons of cargo and passengers during the 13-month period beginning 26 June 1948, an average of 663 flights and 5,504 tons a day. This accomplishment was far greater than had been believed possible when the airlift began.

Today, however, West Berlin has a much higher standard of living than before the 1948-49 airlift, owing largely to the influx of new industries and the expansion of old industries. To maintain the current high standards, West Berlin imported 20,846 tons of freight daily in 1961, using transport of all types. If an airlift became mandatory today, it obviously would not attempt to move any such volume of freight, but some of the problems that were encountered in 1948-49 have been reduced considerably. At that time the airlift was accomplished by a large number of aircraft having different performance characteristics, which resulted in problems of air-traffic control. Similar tonnage movements now could be met with fewer aircraft and flights because of the availability, in sufficient numbers, of transport aircraft possessing far greater cargo capacities and more nearly uniform performance characteristics. During the formulative stages of an airlift, food and other vital necessities would be available from stockpiles established by the West Berliners to meet such an exigency. The reestablishment of an airlift capable of supporting West Berlin therefore seems technically feasible if it were not subject to Soviet interference.

The Soviet Harassment Potential

Judging by the experience of 1948-49 and recent Soviet tactics in the air corridors, lack of interference probably could not be expected. During the 1948-49 airlift, 733 corridor incidents affected US aircraft alone.* Today the Soviets have the capability to interfere with an airlift in the corridors in a number of new ways, significant among which are Electronic Counter Measures (ECM).

The restriction of flights to corridors only 20 miles wide and the high incidence of weather unsuitable for flying by Visual Flight Rules (VFR) necessitates frequent use of Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) by corridor aircraft, a procedure subject to Soviet interference by ECM. For VFR operations the most favorable weather combination is the simultaneous occurrence of a ceiling equal to or greater than 1,500 feet and visibility equal to or greater than 3 miles at Berlin, Hamburg, and Frankfurt. The most unfavorable weather occurs from September through March. The south corridor has the lowest incidence of VFR conditions -- generally less than 19 percent of the time. The incidence of VFR conditions along the central and north corridors is higher -- as much as 23 percent of the time. Because of the high incidence of weather conditions requiring IFR, maximum reliance must be placed on navigational aids, en route and terminal.

According to recent estimates the Soviet Bloc forces in East Germany have the capability to interfere seriously with the Western electronic navigational aids and communications that are required for operation in the Berlin corridors. Although no positive association has been made between certain operational antennas and specific ECM assignments, the Soviet Bloc probably possesses the capability to intercept and jam on any frequency now utilized by Western aircraft engaged in corridor operations, either civil or military.

Five complexes in East Germany have equipment with possible jamming capability, but no jamming signals have been collected from these equipments. They are estimated to have an effective range of 30 miles against the most commonly used US navigation radar. At least five other sites in East Germany possess a capability for passive detection. Another serious problem to be neutralized is Soviet interference with Ground Control Approach (GCA) and Instrument Landing Systems (ILS) equipment used during the critical landing period.

Another form of interference with an airlift now available is meaconing. "Meaconing" is the name given to a deceptive type of ECM, which consists of transmitting over a powerful emitter with the same (or nearly the same) frequency and emission characteristics as a known navigational beacon. These "spoofer" beacons are intended to lure aircraft off their intended paths by simulating genuine beacons located at terminal points or important turning points. Although not officially confirmed, there have been a number of incidents in which deliberate false beaconing may have been employed against US aircraft.

Soviet ECM in the air corridors may be countered by the installation of new or modified navigational equipment; by training crews in the recognition of jamming, meaconing, and corridor landmarks (the latter for VFR operations); and by the adoption of new cockpit procedures. Corridor operations, however, currently do not employ enough pilots trained to cope with a hostile ECM environment nor enough adequately equipped aircraft to operate a successful airlift. If air traffic to Berlin were limited to VFR operations alone, they could not provide sufficient logistical support to fulfill the operational goal of an airlift.

* Buzzing occurred 77 times, close flying 96, flak 54, air-to-air fire 14, flares 59, radio interference 82, searchlights 103, air-to-ground fire 42, ground fire 55, ground explosions 39, rockets 4, balloons 11, chemical laying 54, bombing 36, unidentified objects 7.

One of the best known forms of harassment available to the USSR is close maneuvering of aircraft in the corridors, using locally based aircraft. Operational airfields in proximity to the corridors, their identification, and users are depicted on the accompanying map. In addition to reconnaissance and support units, 18 Soviet regiments of well-trained fighter and bomber crews are deployed in East Germany. Supplementing the Soviet strength is the East German Air Force consisting of 6 jet-fighter regiments and other aircraft of support-type whose crews are in various stages of operational readiness. The Soviets have already indicated their readiness to employ buzzing and close flying to harass Western air operations.

Surface-to-air missiles are particularly useful as a psychological weapon. Currently, Soviet missiles are deployed so as to provide coverage of all of the air corridors and the Berlin terminal area. Furthermore, being mobile, missiles now deployed elsewhere could be shifted to provide additional strength in the corridors.

Another form of air harassment potentially as effective as jamming or other types of interference with Western aircraft is the use of the corridors by Soviet flights. Although Soviet aircraft were not specifically barred, the corridors were used almost exclusively by Western aircraft until February 1962.

The USSR has also utilized procedural tactics for purposes of harassment. Among these have been the filing of flight plans in advance of the West, increasing the number of flights in the corridors, and varying flight patterns to establish a basis for a refusal to guarantee the safety of Western flights because of the priorities of Soviet flights. The USSR has demanded that the West should change its corridor procedures by filing flight plans 24 hours in advance, by providing border-crossing times, and by maintaining aircraft within predetermined altitude levels.

Prospects

Recent Soviet tactics seem to be designed to whittle away Western rights and to demonstrate the need for a single air-traffic control, preferably under East German aegis, by establishing the fact that Soviet planes have the legal right to use the corridors at any time without restrictions on the number of flights. Acceptance of the Soviet demands to change procedures would imply that the Western Powers had accepted the existence of a new situation and had acknowledged that upon entering the corridors they had crossed an international border and were seeking permission to use a corridor under Soviet control. The status of flights in the corridors would then have made a complete reversal from Soviet accommodation to Western flights to Western accommodations to Soviet rules.

Aside from building up its own capability to interfere with Western access to West Berlin, the Soviet Union would have set the stage for East German assumption of what could be described to the world as sovereign prerogatives. When the USSR transferred supervision of the boundary between the East and West Zones of Germany to the East German People's Police on 1 February 1950, it laid the framework for a wide variety of East German harassments and encroachments on the principle of free movement of Germans between East and West Germany, a principle provided for in the quadripartite Agreements of New York and Paris in 1949. All civil passenger and freight traffic on surface routes is now subject to East German customs and immigration control. Recent publications and official statements have indicated that East Germany now intends to exert control over air traffic also. In addition, Soviet statements have indicated that, following the signing of a peace treaty with East Germany, the USSR intends to relinquish to the East Germans its obligations under the Four Power Agreements concerning the movement of troops and materiel of the Western occupation forces to and from West Berlin as well as Soviet representation in BASC.



In June 1961 the East Germans quietly published a decree known as the "Law of 1 August," which could play a significant role in any renegotiation of air access. It requires foreign aircraft to register with an East German air-safety center upon crossing the East German boundary. Western agreement to give the time of border crossing or border-beacon crossing (which could be equated with border crossing) might be interpreted as complying with East German legislation. The law further limits the use of radio equipment in foreign aircraft over East Germany to that based on reciprocity, agreements, or permission of the Ministry of Post and Communications and requires that the radio equipment be approved by this ministry. Radio communications must be limited to messages involving flight safety. This law could form the basis for East German interference with Western air communication and for Soviet insistence on the inclusion of East Germany in any negotiations on air access.

In the field of electronic warfare the USSR has recently assigned East Germany a more active role. This action may be related to East German claims to the right to control the entry of civil aircraft into Berlin and, after the completion of the peace treaty with the USSR, the right to control all access to Berlin.

The East Germans are pushing plans to develop Schoenefeld as the main Berlin airport, to assign it a monopoly on long-distance air routes, and to relegate Templehof to the status of a secondary field serving only short-distance traffic. The Soviets could offer guarantees of Western access in return for the transfer of air-traffic control from Templehof airport to Schoenefeld. Traffic utilizing Schoenefeld, however, is subject to customs and immigration controls, and thus if the East Germans could divert traffic to Schoenefeld they could control it.

In developing Schoenefeld the East Germans have recently modernized transportation facilities for airlines to East Berlin and have developed a system of international air routes on which Schoenefeld is either a stop or a terminal. Bulgarian, Czechoslovakian, Hungarian, Polish, Rumanian, and Soviet airlines have about 21-1/2 flights scheduled into Schoenefeld each week, and the East German airline has 10-1/2 flights scheduled out from Schoenefeld each week. Schoenefeld is a stop on both of the scheduled internal routes: Berlin--Karl-Marx-Stadt and return and Barth-Berlin-Leipzig-Erfurt-Dresden and return.

The USSR has provided itself and East Germany with a broad basis for harassment of Western access to Berlin. These tactics are well suited to bringing pressure on the West to discuss not only the question of air access but the larger political questions such as of the status of West Berlin and the recognition of East Germany.

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